

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 ANKARA 01956 01 OF 02 160154Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 (ISO) W
-----000403 160217Z /65

O 151015Z MAR 78
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1061

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 1956

NODIS

FOR NIMETZ AND VEST

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PEPR, TU
SUBJ: US-TURKISH RELATIONS-CONVERSATION WITH ELEKDAG

REF: ANKARA 1945

1. I ASKED FOR A MEETING WITH ELEKDAG MARCH 14 TO
RECEIVE BRIEFING ON MONTREUX SUMMIT AND TO DISCUSS
THE RECENT UNHAPPY TURN IN US-TURKISH RELATIONS.
FIRST, I ASKED ELEKDAG FOR HIS IMPRESSIONS OF THE
SUMMIT MEETING WHICH HE RELATED AT LENGTH AND WHICH
I HAVE REPORTED IN SEPTTEL (ANKARA 1945). I THEN
TOLD HIM THAT THE RECENT PROBLEM IN US-TURKISH RELATIONS
HAD CAUSED ME SUBSTANTIAL CONCERN. I SAID IT WAS A
SITUATION I PARTICULARLY REGRETTED, SINCE I AND MANY
OF MY COLLEAGUES ADMIRERED THE WAY IN WHICH ECEVIT HAS
APPROACHED WHAT WE CONSIDERED TO BE THE PRINCIPAL
PROBLEM OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY--THE IMPRESSION
THAT IT IS NEGATIVE AND LACKING IN IMAGINATION.
HOWEVER, HAVING MADE THIS OBSERVATION I SAID I WOULD NOT
CHANGE MY IMMEDIATE ASSESSMENT WHICH I HAD GIVEN
TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER THE PREVIOUS FRIDAY THAT THE
PRIME MINISTER'S REACTION TO SECRETARY VANCE'S

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 ANKARA 01956 01 OF 02 160154Z

STATEMENT CONSTITUTED AN OVER-REACTION. I ALSO SAID
THAT TO STATE PUBLICLY THAT THE MONTREUX SUMMIT HAD
BEEN A SUCCESS "DESPITE US ACTIONS" WAS A VERY STRONG
STATEMENT INDEED.

2. I TOLD ELEKDAG THAT I HAD FEARED A SIMILARLY STRONG
OVER-REACTION TO PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT IN WASHINGTON.

I WAS VERY PLEASED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS HAD NOT BEEN THE CASE. I TOLD ELEKDAG I BELIEVED THAT HODDING CARTER'S STATEMENT WAS A GOOD AND CONSTRUCTIVE ONE, THAT IT WAS THE CONSIDERED POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, AND THAT IT SHOULD BE WELCOMED PUBLICLY BY THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY.

3. MY MAIN CONCERN, I SAID, WAS THAT MY OBSERVATIONS OF TURKISH POLITICS LED ME TO FEAR THAT THE THEME WOULD BE PLAYED THAT THE WAY TO GET ALONG WITH THE UNITED STATES IS TO BE TOUGH. I SAID THAT IF THAT THEME RECEIVES WIDESPREAD ACCEPTANCE IT WOULD CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR THE RELATIONSHIP EVEN AFTER THE PASSAGE OF THE DCA.

4. I POINTED OUT THAT IN MY VIEW THE DCA IS NOT THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF OUR RELATIONSHIP BUT AN OBSTACLE TO BE GOTTEN OUT OF THE WAY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO THAT WE CAN GET DOWN TO THE REAL BUSINESS OF BROADENING AND IMPROVING OUR OVERALL RELATIONSHIP. AMERICANS ARE LIKE TURKS, HOWEVER, AND THEY REACT NEGATIVELY TO HEAVY-HANDED PRESSURE.

5. I SAID THAT I BELIEVE WE HAVE A DIFFICULT THREE WEEKS AHEAD OF US AND THAT TO GET THROUGH THAT PERIOD WILL REQUIRE CALMNESS AND COOLNESS ON BOTH SIDES. HE AND I AS PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMATS HAVE A PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS REGARD.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 ANKARA 01956 01 OF 02 160154Z

6. I THEN SAID I WANTED TO GIVE HIM MY CANDID ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN WASHINGTON. I SAID THAT I DID NOT EXPECT AN ADMINISTRATION DECISION TO MOVE ON THE DCA WOULD BE MADE OR PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED BEFORE--OR MUCH BEFORE--THE PRESENTLY SCHEDULED HEARINGS. I ALSO SAID IN MY OWN PERSONAL JUDGMENT THAT IT WOULD BE A BAD TACTICAL MISTAKE TO MAKE SUCH A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT EARLIER, NO MATTER HOW PAINFUL IT WOULD MAKE THE INTERVENING THREE WEEKS.

7. I SAID THAT I HAD READ THE SECRETARY'S ANSWER TO SENATOR SCHWEIKER'S QUESTION MADE IN THE SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE MEETING. WHILE IT WAS PERHAPS NOT EXACTLY WHAT I WOULD HAVE SAID NOR PERHAPS WHAT THE SECRETARY WOULD HAVE SAID HAD IT NOT BEEN AT THE END OF LONG HEARING ON A DIFFERENT SUBJECT, I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT IT PRESENTED MUCH OF A PROBLEM, CERTAINLY NOT ONE TO JUSTIFY THE TURKISH REACTION.

8. I NOTED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER OKCUN HAD TOLD ME MARCH 10 THAT THE GOT WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO BRIEF THE

US IN ADVANCE ON THE TURKISH-CYPRIOT PROPOSALS.
(ELEKDAG SEEMED SURPRISED BY THIS STATEMENT.) I SAID
THAT WE HAD NEVER TAKEN THE POSITION THAT A BRIEFING
ON THE TURKISH-CYPRIOT PROPOSALS WAS A PRE-CONDITION
FOR OUR DECISION ON THE DCA. OUR POSITION IS THAT IT
WOULD BE HELPFUL IF WE COULD HAVE AN IDEA OF THE
PROPOSALS AND THAT IT COULD MATERIALLY AFFECT THE
OUTLOOK FOR SUCCESS IN CONGRESS. I SAID WE WOULD BE
GLAD TO RECEIVE A BRIEFING ON THE PROPOSALS FROM THE
TURKISH-CYPRIOTS IF THAT WOULD EASE ANKARA'S PROBLEMS.

9. I SAID I DIDN'T HAVE ANY INSTRUCTIONS AND I WAS
SPEAKING PERSONALLY, BUT I WAS CONCERNED THAT THE GOT
MIGHT BE MISREADING THE SITUATION IN CONGRESS, ESPECIALLY
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 ANKARA 01956 01 OF 02 160154Z

IN THE LIGHT OF THE ZABLOCKI LETTER. I POINTED OUT THAT
WHEN THE LAST EFFORT HAD BEEN MADE TO LIFT THE EMBARGO
ON JULY 24, 1975, 13 OF THE 19 REPRESENTATIVES WHO
SIGNED THE ZABLOCKI LETTER HAD VOTED IN FAVOR OF
THE MOTION. FIVE HAD NOT VOTED, AND ONLY ONE OF
THE 19 HAD VOTED AGAINST. IT WOULD BE WRONG, THEREFORE,
TO ASSUME THAT THE ZABLOCKI LETTER INDICATES A FUNDAMENTAL
CHANGE IN THE CONGRESSIONAL SITUATION. I SAID IT WAS
MY PERSONAL VIEW THAT PROSPECTS FOR PASSAGE OF THE
DCA WOULD BE BETTER IF THE TURKISH-CYPRIOT PROPOSALS
WERE TO BECOME PUBLIC FIRST. I WOULD NOT LIKE TO
SEE THE DCA DEFEATED BY A SMALL MARGIN, AND WE WOULD
ALL BE SORRY AFTERWARDS IF WE HAD NOT USED EVERY
POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY TO MAXIMIZE SUPPORT. I TOLD
ELEKDAG THAT I RECOGNIZED THE DIFFICULTY FROM TURKISH
POINT OF VIEW, BUT I BELIEVED THE US EXECUTIVE BRANCH
UNDERSTOOD THE TACTICS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL SITUATION
BETTER THAN THE GOT AND THAT PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS OF
SUSPICIONS ABOUT THE ADMINISTRATION'S INTENTIONS-
HOWEVER DEEPLY THOSE SUSPICIONS ARE HELD-WOULD
NOT HELP.

10. I AGAIN EXPRESSED MY CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY
OF A BUILD-UP OF ANTI-AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION SIMILAR
TO WHAT ELEKDAG HAD EARLIER CALLED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
CONDITIONING OF THE GREEK PEOPLE MIGHT BE TAKING PLACE
IN TURKEY. I SAID THAT ANY AMERICAN WHO HAD READ
THE TURKISH PRESS THE LAST TWO DAYS WOULD SHARE
MY FEAR THAT IT COULD GET OUT OF HAND. IT WAS IN
OUR MUTUAL INTEREST TO KEP THE SITUATION UNDER
CONTROL. I SAID I THOUGHT THE SITUATION IN
WASHINGTON, WITH RESPECT TO THE DCA, WAS GOING
WELL BUT THE PROBLEM WAS HERE IN ANKARA WHERE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 ANKARA 01956 01 OF 02 160154Z

THERE WAS A DANGER OF THE PRESS REPEATING THEMES
TO EACH OTHER AND CREATING CRISES.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 ANKARA 01956 02 OF 02 151411Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----118947 151513Z /42
O 151015Z MAR 78
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1062

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 ANKARA 1956

NODIS

FOR NIMETZ AND VEST

11. I THEN ATTEMPTED TO DEAL WITH TWO PARTICULAR
AREAS OF SUSPICION WHICH HAD DEVELOPED OVER THE
WEEKEND. THE FIRST CONCERNED THE TIMING OF THE
DELIVERY OF THE SECRETARY'S REPLY TO THE ZABLOCKI
LETTER. THE SECOND INVOLVED THE QUESTION OF WHO
HAD SOUGHT A DELAY IN CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON THE
DCA. I TOLD ELEKDAG THAT IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION
THE DEPARTMENT HAD CONFIRMED THAT THE DELAY IN HEARINGS
HAD NOT BEEN AT THE INITIATIVE OF THE ADMINISTRATION,
ALTHOUGH IT WAS A MATTER OF MUTUAL CONVENIENCE.

12. ELEKDAG RESPONDED TO MY PRESENTATION BY SAYING
THAT TO UNDERSTAND THE GOT ACTION IT WAS NECESSARY
TO APPRECIATE THE TURKISH FRAME OF MIND AT THE TIME.
HE SAID CARAMANLIS HAD AGREED ONLY RELUCTANTLY TO
THE SUMMIT MEETING. IN THE DAYS PRIOR TO THE MEETING
THE GREEK-CYPRIOIS (AND THE GREEKS TO A LESSER
EXTEND) HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEIR PRIMARY
OBJECTIVE WAS TO MAINTAIN THE EMBARGO. CARAMANLIS
HAD EVEN, ALBEIT PERHAPS RELUCTANTLY, TAKEN THE PUBLIC
POSITION THAT A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT MEETING SHOULD NOT

HELP TURKEY GET RID OF THE EMBARGO. THE GOT
BELIEVED THAT THE SUMMIT MEETING WAS A GOOD THING
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 ANKARA 01956 02 OF 02 151411Z

AND THAT ITS SUCCESS WOULD SERVE THE INTERESTS OF
THE UNITED STATES. THEN WHEN TURKISH LEADERS HAD
LEARNED OF THE ZABLOCKI LETTER AND OF THE FACT THAT
THE ADMINISTRATION HAD NOT RESPONDED FORTHWITH,
SUSPICIONS BEGAN TO GROW. THE GOT THEN ASKED-
AND IT WAS NOT TOO MUCH TO ASK, ELEKDAG SAID-FOR
SOME STATEMENT THAT MIGHT HAVE A FAVORABLE EFFECT
ON THE MONTREUX MEETING. THE GOT BELIEVED THAT
IF THE US HAD RESPONDED POSITIVELY THE DISCUSSIONS
AT MONTREUX WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE SUBSTANTIVE. SUCH
A STATEMENT WAS NOT MADE, HOWEVER, AND THEN ON
MARCH 9 THE TURKS RECEIVED ANOTHER SURPRISE-THE
SECRETARY'S STATEMENT BEFORE THE SENATE APPROPRIATIONS
COMMITTEE. ELEKDAG SAID THAT WHEN HE AND ECEVIT HAD
READ THE STATEMENT THEY HAD CONCLUDED THAT IT WOULD
CREATE THE EXACT OPPOSITE SITUATION FROM WHAT THE
GOT HAD WANTED AND EXPECTED. FOR THE UNITED STATES
TO SAY THAT IT WOULD DETERMINE ITS POSITION ON THE
DCA AFTER THE MONTREUX SUMMIT AND AFTER SEEING THE
NATURE OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS "DID NOT
HELP THE MONTREUX MEETING, TO SAY THE LEAST".
ELEKDAG SAID THAT THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT NOT
ONLY ENCOURAGED THE GREEKS TO BE NEGATIVE, IT WAS
ALSO CONTRARY TO THE EARLIER STATEMENT MADE BY THE
SECRETARY TO PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT.

13. I SAID I DISAGREED WITH ELEKDAG'S INTERPRETATION OF THE VANCE
STATEMENT. IN RESPONSE ELEKDAG (READING ITS TEXT) SAID "YOU CAN
DISAGREE, BUT MY EYES AGREE WITH ME". HE SAID THE US ATTITUDE WAS
ENIGNATIC. THE TURKS HAD BEEN PUZZLED ABOUT WHAT
MOTIVATED THE SECRETARY TO MAKE SUCH A STATEMENT.
THE "BELATED" RESPONSE BY THE SECRETARY TO THE
ZABLOCKI LETTER HAD BEEN MERELY AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 ANKARA 01956 02 OF 02 151411Z

OF RECEIPT.

14. I THEN ENCOURAGED ELEKDAG TO READ HODDING CARTER'S
STATEMENT CAREFULLY. I SAID OUR CONSISTENT POSITION
IN DEALING WITH THE GREEKS AND GREEK CYPRIOTS HAS BEEN
THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS NOT MADE A LIKAGE BETWEEN
THE DCA AND CYPRUS. WE TELL THEM THAT THE DECISION ON THE DCA

WILL BE MADE IN THE LIGHT OF ALL US INTERESTS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. I SAID IT WAS MY PERSONAL VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE AT THIS POINT TO TRY TO DISABUSE CONGRESS OF THE LINKAGE. I SAID IT WOULD BE MUCH BETTER TO TELL THOSE CONGRESSMEN WHO MAKE THE LINKAGE THAT CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED IN THE CYPRUS SITUATION AND THAT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE.

14. ELEKDAG RETURNED TO THE TURKISH IMPRESSION OF WHAT THIS UNUSUAL CONFLUENCE OF INCIDENTS HAD MEANT. HE SAID THE GOT HAD INTERPRETED IT AS AN EFFORT BY THE UNITED STATES TO "TWIST OUR ARM". HE SAID THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS HAD MADE THEM BELIEVE THEY HAD PROOF OF THIS NEGATIVE US INTENTION. "WE UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER BETTER NOW", HE CONCLUDED. I ASSURED ELEKDAG THAT I HAD TRIED TO PROTRAY ACCURATELY TO WASHINGTON THE REASONS FOR AND NATURE OF TURKISH SUSPICIONS. I AGAIN TOLD HIM THAT I WAS PLEASED BY THE WAY THINGS WERE PROGRESSING IN WASHINGTON, AND I REPEATED MY PERSONAL VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE UNDESIRABLE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO MAKE A DECISION ON THE DCA PUBLIC VERY FAR IN ADVANCE OF THE HEARINGS.

15. FINALLY I REPEATED MY VIEW THAT THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT WAS UNDERSTANDABLE IN CONTEXT AND THAT THE TURKISH RESPONSE HAD BEEN A GROSS OVER-REACTION. I AGAIN ENCOURAGED ELEKDAG TO READ CAREFULLY HODDING CARTER'S STATEMENT OF 13 MARCH, WHICH I REPEATED WAS A CONSIDERED STATEMENT OF US POLICY.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 ANKARA 01956 02 OF 02 151411Z

16. COMMENT: ELEKDAG WAS SLIGHTLY DEFENSIVE ABOUT GOT REACTION TO THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT-BUT ONLY SLIGHTLY. HE CLEARLY BELIEVES THAT EVEN THOUGH ECEVIT HAY HAVE OVER-REACTED, HIS REACTION WAS UNDERSTANDABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. I BELIEVE ELEKDAG IS REASSURED, BUT I AM NOT SURE ABOUT ECEVIT. MY SERIOUS CONCERN IS, AS I TOLD ELEKDAG, THAT THE LESSON THE TURKS WILL TAKE FROM THIS EPISODE IS THAT THE BEST WAY TO DEAL WITH AMERICANS IS TO PLAY TOUGH. THIS DANGER IS COMPOUNDED BY THE FACT THAT ECEVIT'S INDULGENCE IN ANTI-US STATEMENTS EVOKED STRONG SIMPLE-MINDED SUPPORT IN THE TURKISH PRESS. I FEAR THERE IS JUST ENOUGH OF THE DEMOGOGUE IN ECEVIT-RESPONDING LIKE AN ACTOR BEFORE AN ENTHUSIASTIC AUDIENCE-THAT HE WILL BE TEMPTED TO RESORT TO THIS DEVICE WHENEVER THINGS DO NOT GO HIS WAY. I HOPE I'M WRONG, BUT THE FIRST TEST COULD BE ECEVIT'S PUBLIC RESPONSE TO HODDING CARTER'S STATEMENT, AND MARCH 15 PRESS REPORTS OF HIS INITIAL RESPONSE ARE

NOT REASSURING.
SPIERS

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, MILITARY ASSISTANCE, MEETINGS, CAT-A
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 15 mar 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978ANKARA01956
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: OR NIMETZ AND VEST
Executive Order: X3 19980315
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: P850101-2100
Format: TEL
From: ANKARA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780368/aaaacfhf.tel
Line Count: 334
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 42fc6dc7-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: 78 ANKARA 1945
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 07 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3330505
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: US-TURKISH RELATIONS-CONVERSATION WITH ELEKDAG
TAGS: PEPR, MASS, PREL, TU, US, CY
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/42fc6dc7-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014